Philosophers' Imprint 18:1-17 (2018)
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Abstract |
Just as theory of representation is deficient if it can’t explain how misrepresentation is possible, a theory of computation is deficient if it can’t explain how miscomputation is possible. Nonetheless, philosophers have generally ignored miscomputation. My primary goal in this paper is to clarify both what miscomputation is and how to adequately explain it. Miscomputation is a special kind of malfunction: a system miscomputes when it computes in a way that it shouldn’t. To explain miscomputation, you must provide accounts of computational behavior, computational norms, and how computational behavior can deviate from computational norms. A secondary goal of this paper is to defend an (quasi-)individualist, mechanistic theory of miscomputation. Computational behavior is narrowly individuated. Computational norms are widely individuated. A system miscomputes when its behavior manifests a narrow computational structure that the widely individuated norms say that it should not have.
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Keywords | miscomputation mechanistic theory of computation computational individualism Gualtiero Piccinini teleological function |
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Reprint years | 2018 |
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References found in this work BETA
A Computational Foundation for the Study of Cognition.David Chalmers - 2011 - Journal of Cognitive Science 12 (4):323-357.
Individuation Without Representation.Joe Dewhurst - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (1):103-116.
Are There Teleological Functions to Compute?Dimitri Coelho Mollo - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 86 (3):431-452.
Functional Individuation, Mechanistic Implementation: The Proper Way of Seeing the Mechanistic View of Concrete Computation.Dimitri Coelho Mollo - 2017 - Synthese 195 (8):3477-3497.
View all 18 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Why Mental Disorders Are Not Like Software Bugs.Harriet Fagerberg - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science:1-42.
Against Computational Perspectivalism.Dimitri Coelho Mollo - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (4):1129-1153.
Long-Arm Functional Individuation of Computation.Nir Fresco - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13993-14016.
Why Go for a Computation-Based Approach to Cognitive Representation.Dimitri Coelho Mollo - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6875-6895.
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