Truthmaking, grounding and Fitch’s paradox

Analysis 81 (2):270-274 (2021)
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Abstract

Jago and Loss have recently used variations on Fitch's paradox to argue that every truth has a truthmaker, and that every fact is grounded. In this paper, I show that Fitch's paradox can also be adapted to prove the exact opposite conclusions: no truth has a truthmaker, and no fact is grounded. All of these arguments are as dialectically effective as each other, and so they are all in bad company.

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Robert Trueman
University of York

Citations of this work

Which Fitch?Mark Jago - 2021 - Analysis 81 (3):436-439.
A Novel Argument for Fatalism.Kunihisa Morita - 2023 - Manuscrito 46 (4):2023-0014.
Humberstone’s Paradox and Conjunction.Eric T. Updike - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (3):1183-1195.

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References found in this work

There are no fundamental facts.Roberto Loss - 2021 - Analysis 81 (1):32-39.

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