Responding to historical injustices: Collective inheritance and the moral irrelevance of group identity

European Journal of Political Theory 23 (I):65-84 (2024)
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Abstract

I argue that changes in the numerical identity of groups do not necessarily speak in favour of the supersession of some historical injustice. I contend that the correlativity between the perpetrator and the victim of injustices is not broken when the identity of groups changes. I develop this argument by considering indigenous people's claims in Argentina for the injustices suffered during the Conquest of the Desert. I argue that present claimants do not need to be part of the same entity whose members suffered injustices many years ago. For identifying the proper recipients of reparation, all that is necessary is that the group who suffered the historical injustice under consideration has survived into the present. I also support a view upon which present living members of a certain group have reasons to redress those injustices perpetrated by their predecessors if they are relevantly connected with each other. In particular, by relying on the notion of collective inheritance, I argue that if present-day members of a certain group claim that they are the continuation of the group whose past members bequeathed them certain goods, they cannot consistently reject such a membership when the very same people legated them certain evils.

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Author's Profile

Santiago Truccone
University of Graz

Citations of this work

Supersession and compensation for historical injustice.Lukas H. Meyer & Timothy Waligore - forthcoming - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The Morality of Freedom.Joseph Raz - 1986 - Philosophy 63 (243):119-122.
National Responsibility and Global Justice.David Miller - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The morality of freedom.J. Raz - 1988 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (1):108-109.
Superseding historic injustice.Jeremy Waldron - 1992 - Ethics 103 (1):4-28.

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