Luca Tranchini
Universität Tübingen
In this paper we show how Dummett-Prawitz-style proof-theoretic semantics has to be modified in order to cope with paradoxical phenomena. It will turn out that one of its basic tenets has to be given up, namely the definition of the correctness of an inference as validity preservation. As a result, the notions of an argument being valid and of an argument being constituted by correct inference rules will no more coincide. The gap between the two notions is accounted for by introducing the distinction between sense and denotation in the proof-theoretic-semantic setting.
Keywords Proof-theoretic semantics  paradox  sense  denotation   validity  tonk
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Proof-Theoretic Semantics.Peter Schroeder-Heister - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Advances in Proof-Theoretic Semantics.Peter Schroeder-Heister & Thomas Piecha (eds.) - 2015 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag.

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