On moral considerability: An essay on who morally matters

Philosophical Review 109 (4):595-598 (2000)
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Abstract

Who or what is morally considerable? That is to say, what merits direct moral consideration—consideration in light of what it is? Mark Bernstein steers a middle course between the extremes he labels “chauvinism” and “deep ecology.” Chauvinists hold that, at most, all human beings are morally considerable. Deep ecologists are either individualists who hold that every living thing is morally considerable or holists who hold that ecosystems but not their constituent parts are considerable in themselves.

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