Synthese 195 (8):3389-3406 (2018)

Josefa Toribio
Universitat de Barcelona
According to so-called “thin” views about the content of experience, we can only visually experience low-level features such as colour, shape, texture or motion. According to so-called “rich” views, we can also visually experience some high-level properties, such as being a pine tree or being threatening. One of the standard objections against rich views is that high-level properties can only be represented at the level of judgment. In this paper, I first challenge this objection by relying on some recent studies in social vision. Secondly, I tackle a different but related issue, namely, the idea that, if the content of experience is rich, then perception is cognitively penetrable. Against this thesis, I argue that the very same criteria that help us vindicate the truly sensory nature of our rich experiences speak against their being cognitively penetrable.
Keywords Visual experience  High-level properties  Low-level properties  Cognitive penetrability  Social vision
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-015-0889-8
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References found in this work BETA

The Predictive Mind.Jakob Hohwy - 2013 - Oxford University Press UK.
The Contents of Visual Experience.Susanna Siegel - 2010 - Oxford University Press USA.

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Citations of this work BETA

Recent Issues in High-Level Perception.Grace Helton - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (12):851-862.
Rational Relations Between Perception and Belief: The Case of Color.Peter Brössel - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (4):721-741.
Implicit Biases in Visually Guided Action.Berit Brogaard - 2021 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 17):S3943–S3967.

View all 16 citations / Add more citations

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