Abstract

This dissertation argues for a neglected category of moral value, the supererogatory, as taking ethical agency seriously. After tracing supererogation's history, complex modern semantics, and conceptual analogues in Orthodox Judaism and Mahayana Buddhism, it defines supererogation using four conditions: Positive Moral Value, Non-Obligatoriness, Beneficence, and Moderate Cost . A new view of moral duty is defended, allowing for conflicts of ethical duty, which is based on a Comprehensive Protection Thesis for agents. Reflecting values as justificatory commitments, reasons for action are linked to this picture of duty. Both agent-relative and agent-neutral values exist, resulting in concomitant reasons for action. Supererogation requires agent-neutrality because the value of such actions does not depend upon any particular agent valuing them, but also agent-relativity because such actions are not required by morality but optional. ;Next, a moderate position in normative ethics is defended against consequentialist challenges. Shelly Kagan maintains that the moderate is committed to a pro tanto reason for promoting the good, which effectively denies agent-based options and therefore supererogation. In response, arguments are made for both options and constraints, allowing the ethical "elbow room" that supererogation demands. Supererogation is possible if and only if morality allows for integrity. The analysis also shows that a traditional understanding of supererogation as oversubscribing one's duties is seriously misleading. Parallel challenges to supererogation from Kantian rigorism are then rejected. Taking supererogation to entail a class of actions immune to the call of duty, rigorists confuse morality's stringency with its pervasiveness. While they deny that imperfect duties allow latitude for supererogation, this is found unacceptable by Kant's own principles. Finally, the view of moral agency undergirding preceding chapters is detailed. The integrity of a moral agent connotes devotion to one's own ideals, but supererogation demands solidarity with a community of fellows. Supererogation functions as an integrating ethical notion for agents concerned with multiple commitments. It also provides crucial resources for the maintenance and renewal of the trust binding societies together. A reassessment of moral saintliness brings the project to a close