The Simple Theory of Counterfactuals

Abstract

The standard account of counterfactuals that most philosophers endorse—Lewis's 'Analysis 1' — is wrong. The correct theory is one invented by Jonathan Bennett in 1984 which he called 'The Simple Theory'. Bennett later argued himself out of that theory and went on to champion the standard account. But those arguments fail. The Simple Theory has been right all along.

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Author's Profile

Terrance A. Tomkow
Cambridge University (PhD)

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