Abstract

If reason and emotion are taken as inseparable founda–tional components of human nature, then all knowledge must be characterized by both objective description and subjective, felt experience. If that is the case, then it is impossible for autonomy to be described in terms of rational knowledge, independent of affective response. Accordingly, autonomy and interdependence are mutually inclusive terms. Following the assumption that reason and emotion are integrally related in human understanding, morality can be explained by reference to both rational principles and emotive, unreflected experience. Spinoza, Hume, and Vasu–bandhu provide three different but compatible views of moral development based on their views of the mutually informing effect of reason and emotion on motivation for action. In contrast to Kant, they describe the morally autonomous person as one who is directed by personal interests shaped by a consciousness of the context of emerging interrelated conditions. It is a context in which individual self–expression is a function of receptivity and responsiveness to the expression of others.