Polity (2015)

Authors
Deborah Tollefsen
University of Memphis
Abstract
In the social sciences and in everyday speech we often talk about groups as if they behaved in the same way as individuals, thinking and acting as a singular being. We say for example that "Google intends to develop an automated car", "the U.S. Government believes that Syria has used chemical weapons on its people", or that "the NRA wants to protect the rights of gun owners". We also often ascribe legal and moral responsibility to groups. But could groups literally intend things? Is there such a thing as a collective mind? If so, should groups be held morally responsible? Such questions are of vital importance to our understanding of the social world. In this lively, engaging introduction Deborah Tollefsen offers a careful survey of contemporary philosophers? answers to these questions, and argues for the unorthodox view that certain groups should, indeed, be treated as agents and deserve to be held morally accountable. Tollefsen explores the nature of belief, action and intention, and shows the reader how a belief in group agency can be reconciled with our understanding of individual agency and accountability. _Groups as Agents_ will be a vital resource for scholars as well as for students of philosophy and the social sciences encountering the topic for the first time
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy this book $15.95 used (33% off)   $16.00 new (33% off)   $23.95 from Amazon    Amazon page
ISBN(s) 9780745684833   9780745684840   9780745684864   9780745684871   074568484X   0745684831
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 69,979
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Group Agency and Artificial Intelligence.Christian List - 2021 - Philosophy and Technology (4):1-30.
Cultural Appropriation and the Intimacy of Groups.C. Thi Nguyen & Matthew Strohl - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (4):981-1002.
Social Ontology.Brian Epstein - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 67 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Ontology of Collective Action.Kirk Ludwig - 2014 - In Sara Chant Frank Hindriks & Gerhard Preyer (eds.), From Individual to Collective Intentionality: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
Collective Intentionality and the Social Sciences.Deborah Perron Tollefsen - 2002 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (1):25-50.
Interpreting Organizations.Deborah Perron Tollefsen - 2002 - Dissertation, The Ohio State University
Group Rights and Group Agency.Adina Preda - 2012 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (2):229-254.
Holding Them Responsible.Paul Sheehy - 2006 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):74–93.
Hobbes On The Simulation Of Collective Agency.Timothy Martell - 2009 - Minerva - An Internet Journal of Philosophy 13:28-52.
The Ontology of Social Agency.Frederick Stoutland - 2008 - Analyse & Kritik 30 (2):533-551.
Whose Rights? A Critique of Individual Agency as the Basis of Rights.E. Glen Weyl - 2009 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 8 (2):139-171.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2015-10-14

Total views
18 ( #607,806 of 2,504,866 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
8 ( #91,044 of 2,504,866 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes