Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 34 (2):33-52 (2020)

Tamaz Tokhadze
University of Sussex
In this paper, I argue that Steadfast Views of peer disagreement – a family of views according to which standing firm in the face of peer disagreement can be rationally permissible -- are incoherent. First, I articulate two constraints that any Steadfast Views of disagreement should endorse: (i) Steadfastness’s Core (ii) The Deference Principle. I show that (i) and (ii) are inconsistent: they cannot both be true. My argument, briefly put, is that one cannot rationally treat one’s peer’s opinion as unconditionally relevant to a hypothesis, H, but conditional on the supposition of a disagreement, irrelevant to H. Because Steadfast Views endorse a set of mutually inconsistent propositions, I conclude that Steadfast Views are incoherent.
Keywords peer disagreement  steadfast views  deference principle  conditional independence
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