Naturalizing Moral Justification: Rethinking the Method of Moral Epistemology

Metaphilosophy 44 (4):409-439 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The companion piece to this article, “Situating Moral Justification,” challenges the idea that moral epistemology's mission is to establish a single, all-purpose reasoning strategy for moral justification because no reasoning practice can be expected to deliver authoritative moral conclusions in all social contexts. The present article argues that rethinking the mission of moral epistemology requires rethinking its method as well. Philosophers cannot learn which reasoning practices are suitable to use in particular contexts exclusively by exploring logical relations among concepts. Instead, in order to understand which reasoning practices are capable of justifying moral claims in different types of contexts, we need to study empirically the relationships between reasoning practices and the contexts in which they are used. The article proposes that philosophers investigate case studies of real-world moral disputes in which people lack shared cultural assumptions and/or are unequal in social power. It motivates and explains the proposed case study method and illustrates the philosophical value of this method through a case study

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,202

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The Relevance of Trust for Moral Justification.Theresa Weynand Tobin - 2011 - Social Theory and Practice 37 (4):599-628.
Contextualism and Moral Justification.Friderik Klampfer - 2005 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):569-582.
Reflective Equilibrium Without Intuitions?Georg Brun - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):237-252.
Moral Judgments and the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction.Jennifer McCrickerd - 2001 - Journal of Philosophical Research 26:423-433.
Moral Skepticism and Justification.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1996 - In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Mark Timmons (eds.), Moral knowledge?: new readings in moral epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press.
Topical epistemologies.Todd Stewart - 2007 - Metaphilosophy 38 (1):23–43.
Do normative facts need to explain?Jeremy Randel Koons - 2000 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (3):246–272.
Summary of Moral Sketicisms.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2008 - Philosophical Books 49 (3):193-196.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-07-04

Downloads
127 (#138,088)

6 months
11 (#191,387)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Alison Jaggar
University of Colorado, Boulder
Theresa Tobin
Marquette University