Why did Weyl think that formalism's victory against intuitionism entails a defeat of pure phenomenology?

History and Philosophy of Logic 35 (2):198-208 (2014)
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Abstract

This paper argues that Weyl took formalism to prevail over intuitionism with respect to supporting scientific objectivity, rather than grounding classical mathematics, and that this was what he thought was enough for rejecting pure phenomenology as well.

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Why Did Weyl Think That Emmy Noether Made Algebra the Eldorado of Axiomatics?Iulian D. Toader - 2021 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 11 (1):122-142.
Introduction to the special issue Hermann Weyl and the philosophy of the ‘New Physics’.Silvia De Bianchi & Gabriel Catren - 2018 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 61:1-5.

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