Quitting certainties: a Bayesian framework modeling degrees of belief

Oxford: Oxford University Press (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Michael G. Titelbaum presents a new Bayesian framework for modeling rational degrees of belief—the first of its kind to represent rational requirements on agents who undergo certainty loss.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 107,099

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-05-28

Downloads
124 (#188,817)

6 months
5 (#988,871)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Michael Titelbaum
University of Wisconsin, Madison

Citations of this work

Time-Slice Rationality.Brian Hedden - 2015 - Mind 124 (494):449-491.
Accuracy, Coherence and Evidence.Branden Fitelson & Kenny Easwaran - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5:61-96.
Interpretations of probability.Alan Hájek - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Fundamental Problem of Logical Omniscience.Peter Hawke, Aybüke Özgün & Francesco Berto - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (4):727-766.
The Nature of Awareness Growth.Chloé de Canson - 2024 - Philosophical Review 133 (1):1-32.

View all 58 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references