Quitting Certainties: A Bayesian Framework Modeling Degrees of Belief

Oxford University Press (2012)

Abstract

Michael G. Titelbaum presents a new Bayesian framework for modeling rational degrees of belief—the first of its kind to represent rational requirements on agents who undergo certainty loss.

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Michael Titelbaum
University of Wisconsin, Madison

Chapters

Introduction

This chapter introduces Subjective Bayesianism and describes its recent rise to prominence in many areas of philosophy, especially epistemology. The chapter then discusses how Bayesianism’s traditional updating norm for degrees of belief—updating by Conditionalization—fails for application... see more

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Citations of this work

Accuracy, Coherence and Evidence.Branden Fitelson & Kenny Easwaran - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5:61-96.
Time-Slice Rationality.Brian Hedden - 2015 - Mind 124 (494):449-491.
Updating for Externalists.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2021 - Noûs 55 (3):487-516.
Interpretations of Probability.Alan Hájek - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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