"Seeing Connexions" in Psychology: An Explication and Application of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Method
Dissertation, Georgetown University (
1999)
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Abstract
Wittgenstein is known to have regarded his later philosophical method as his most important contribution to philosophy and the social sciences. But despite continuing discussion of his philosophical writings on the part of philosophers and evidence of growing interest in his ideas on the part of social scientists, the method has fallen into disuse. It is argued that such is the case in mainstream academic psychology, where those allying themselves with Wittgenstein have made eclectic use of his ideas and terminology while opting not to expand upon ways his method might be used to address conceptual and methodological problems in their domains of inquiry. An examination of what is necessary and sufficient for psychologist's understanding and appreciation of the whys, wherefores and characteristics of Wittgenstein's method is undertaken, with an eye toward relevant perspectives in contemporary psychology to which they might be compared and contrasted. Emphasis is placed on Wittgenstein's intellectual heritage, personal and philosophical styles, transitions in thinking that led to development of the method and his own transitional and mature remarks on philosophy and method. Examination of Wittgenstein's remarks on philosophy and method affords a narrowing of focus on principles psychologists will need to keep in mind when identifying possible conceptual problems and applying the method as a prophylaxis against those problems. Wittgenstein's own use of the method is examined through study of his remarks on the cognitive performance of reading, which leads to application of the method to two problem domains in psychology. First, Wittgenstein's remarks on the emotions are expanded upon in order to address the question of whether sensations are necessary for emotional experience and expression. Second, the method is used without the benefit of Wittgenstein's remarks to address the question of whether or not human neonates can be said to "imitate" adult facial and bodily gestures. Suggestions are made as to which other problem domains in psychology might benefit from use of the method