Sollen und Können.“Du kannst, denn du sollst” und “Sollen impliziert Können” im Vergleich
Abstract
In this paper, I explore two closely related ethical principles, ‘Ought implies Can’ and the Kantian ‘Du kannst, denn du sollst’ . The former principle is mainly used to diffuse moral dilemmas and other problem cases. Possibility is a necessary condition of obligation. Recent criticism notwithstanding, the principle is shown to be defensible and useful in the case of genuine, action-guiding oughts. The latter principle makes use of the former, but it in addition presupposes the validity of a moral command and on that basis concludes that the agent must be able to act accordingly. ‘Du kannst, denn du sollst’ has its roots in Kantian ethics: the firm consciousness of moral necessity serves as the ratio cognoscendi of human freedom. The principle is mainly directed against metaphysical scepticism turning on the validity of natural determinism. It is doubtful whether many non-Kantians would be willing to support it in its original metaphysical incarnation