Doomsday Needn’t Be So Bad

Dialectica 72 (2):275-296 (2018)
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10.1111/1746-8361.12227

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Travis Timmerman
Seton Hall University

Citations of this work

Dismantling the Asymmetry Argument.Vlastimil Vohánka - 2019 - Journal of Value Inquiry 53 (1):75-90.
The Significance of Future Generations.Roman Altshuler - 2021 - In Michael Cholbi & Travis Timmerman (eds.), Exploring the Philosophy of Death and Dying: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 191-199.

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References found in this work

Mortal questions.Thomas Nagel - 1979 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Well-being and death.Ben Bradley - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Death and the Afterlife.Samuel Scheffler - 2013 - New York, NY: Oup Usa. Edited by Niko Kolodny.
Mortal Questions.[author unknown] - 1979 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 43 (3):578-578.

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