Deflationary normative pluralism

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (5):pp. 231-262 (2007)
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Abstract

Let us give voice to this new demand: we need a critique of moral values, the value of these values should itself, for once, be examined. - Friedrich NietzscheAnyone who, stimulated by education, has come to feel the force of the various obligations in life, at some time or other comes to feel the irksomeness of carrying them out, and to recognize the sacrifice of interest involved; and, if thoughtful, he inevitably puts to himself the question: “Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act? … Should I not really be justified in simply trying to have a good time?” - H.A. Prichard.

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Evan Tiffany
Simon Fraser University

Citations of this work

Skepticism about Ought Simpliciter.Derek Clayton Baker - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13.
The Authority of Formality.Jack Woods - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13.
Authoritatively Normative Concepts.Tristram McPherson - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13:253-277.
Beliefs That Wrong.Rima Basu - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Southern California
Against quietist normative realism.Tristram McPherson - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (2):223-240.

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References found in this work

Facts and Values.Peter Railton - 1986 - Philosophical Topics 14 (2):5-31.
A Theory of the Good and the Right.Richard B. Brandt - 1979 - Philosophy 55 (213):412-414.
Realist-Expressivism: A Neglected Option for Moral Realism.David Copp - 2001 - Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (2):1-43.
Internal reasons.Michael Smith - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1):109-131.
Externalist moral realism.David O. Brink - 1986 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (S1):23-41.

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