Abstract

This dissertation is intended to accomplish three things: the first is to describe Descartes' treatment of human errors of judgment and human errors of natural disposition. The second is to critically analyze his arguments with respect to these forms of human error. The third is to demonstrate the consequences, both theodicean and philosophical, of the shortcomings in Descartes' arguments with respect to human error. ;In his Meditations Descartes considered two forms of human error, errors of judgment and errors of natural disposition. In the Third Meditation station Descartes concluded that he had been created by an infinitely perfect and, as such, veracious god. Now, granting that human beings are not aiming at errors of judgment, such errors appear, at first glance, anomalous from the standpoint of divine veracity. ;In the Fourth Meditation, Descartes set out to establish the ontological consistency of divine perfection and veracity with the existence of erroneous judgments. In the Sixth Meditation Descartes argued that human beings often fall into error by mistaking the purpose for the sake of which the faculty of sensation has been bestowed upon them. At first glance, each of these forms of error constitutes a challenge to God's infinite perfection and derivatively his veracity. It follows that each of these forms of error constitutes a fundamental challenge to Descartes' philosophy. ;I contend that Descartes' arguments with respect to human error are not adequate, i.e., they do not demonstrate upon detailed analysis the ontological compatibility of human error and God's infinite perfection. In the final analysis, then, Descartes failed to adequately explain those forms of human error which, at first glance, appeared anomolous from the standpoint of the hypothesis that the universe is the work of an infinitely perfect creator. It follows that those anomalies cast a shadow of doubt upon the hypothesis of divine perfection and, derivatively, upon the divine guarantee of clear and distinct ideas