Venting as Epistemic Work

Social Epistemology 33 (2):101-110 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

ABSTRACTWe claim that venting can be epistemic work: if one vents to the right sort of person, knowledge can be gained about an oppressive social structure, one’s place in it, and how to repair the epistemic damage it creates. To justify this claim, we define both epistemic damage and venting, and contrast venting with related notions such as complaining and ranting. Using Code’s understanding of testimony, Dotson’s notion of a linguistic exchange, and Fricker’s distinction between testimonial and hermeneutical injustice, we describe when and how venting is epistemic work. We also discuss the way venting is distinct from consciousness raising. We conclude that although one goal of venting is to repair epistemic damage for individual women, venting’s positive epistemic impact prepares women to challenge hermeneutical injustice.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,202

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Epistemic Agency.Hilary Kornblith - 2016 - In Miguel Ángel Fernández Vargas (ed.), Performance Epistemology: Foundations and Applications. New York, NY: Oxford University Press UK.
Epistemic responsibility.J. Angelo Corlett - 2008 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (2):179 – 200.
Epistemic Reductionism and the Moral-Epistemic Disparity.Chris Heathwood - 2018 - In Christos Kyriacou & Robin McKenna (eds.), Metaepistemology: Realism & Antirealism. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 45-70.
Epistemic normativity.Hilary Kornblith - 1993 - Synthese 94 (3):357 - 376.
Epistemic Value.Patrick Bondy - 2015 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy:0-0.
Resisting Structural Epistemic Injustice.Michael Doan - 2018 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 4 (4).
Epistemic Emotions.Adam Morton - 2009 - In Peter Goldie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. Oxford University Press. pp. 385--399.
Epistemic Akrasia.Brian Ribeiro - 2011 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 1 (1):18-25.
Epistemic Consequentialism.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Jeff Dunn (eds.) - 2018 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-02-12

Downloads
36 (#419,193)

6 months
6 (#417,196)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Juli Thorson
Ball State University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Testimony, Trust, Knowing.Jonathan E. Adler - 1994 - Journal of Philosophy 91 (5):264-275.
Truth, Value and Epistemic Expressivism.Michael P. Lynch - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):76-97.
The transmission of knowledge.Michael Welbourne - 1979 - Philosophical Quarterly 29 (114):1-9.

View all 15 references / Add more references