The philosophical foundations of risk

Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (2):273-286 (1986)
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Abstract

Rescher's 1983 study of risk analysis marks an important departure from game theory in that philosophical foundations for risk are neither formal nor implicit, But explicitly defined objective properties. Rescher's claim that these foundations are ontological fails, However. His ontology is internally inconsistent. Furthermore, Risk is always interest relative, Making it impossible to remove epistemological considerations entirely from any account of its foundations.

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Paul B. Thompson
Michigan State University

Citations of this work

Une ontologie dispositionnelle du risque.Olivier Grenier & Adrien Barton - 2021 - Lato Sensu: Revue de la Société de Philosophie des Sciences 8 (2):58-69.

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