David L. Thompson
Memorial University of Newfoundland
A self is a temporal unity in which responsibility for past commitments modifies how the present world is experienced and evaluated. This structure is analogous (a) to biological evolutionary changes in perception and (b) to how changes in a computer program determine how it will respond in the future. Responsibility is not an add-on to a self, but the mode of its integration over time. (Presented at Royal Institute of Philosophy Annual Conference, Narrative and Understanding Persons, University of Hertfordshire, UK, 2005)
Keywords Selfhood, Responsibility, attribution, commitment, Locke, Parfit, Schechtman, Ricoeur
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