The Genealogy of Epistemic Virtue Concepts

Philosophical Papers 37 (3):345-369 (2008)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Abstract This paper examines the treatment of thick ethical concepts in Williams's work in order to evaluate the consistency of his treatment of ethical and epistemic concepts and to assess whether the idea of a thick concept can be extended from ethics to epistemology. A virtue epistemology is described modeled on a cognitivist virtue ethics. Williams's genealogy of the virtues surrounding propositional knowledge (the virtues of ?truthfulness?) is critically evaluated. It is concluded that this genealogy is an important contribution to the project of virtue epistemology. Thick concepts must not only feature in the account but will sustain more of the marks of objectivity than their ethical counterparts. This is so even on Williams's demanding assumptions



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 86,592

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library


Added to PP

108 (#140,099)

6 months
5 (#193,533)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Alan Thomas
University of York

Citations of this work

A Solution to Knowledge’s Threshold Problem.Michael Hannon - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (3):607-629.
Epistemic Virtues in Business.Boudewijn de Bruin - 2013 - Journal of Business Ethics 113 (4):583-595.
Thick Concepts.Brent G. Kyle - 2016 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Virtue and Reason.John Mcdowell - 1979 - The Monist 62 (3):331-350.
Objective and unconditioned value.Rae Langton - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):157-185.
How to be a Virtue Epistemologist.Christopher Hookway - 2003 - In Linda Zagzebski & Michael DePaul (eds.), Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives From Ethics and Epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 183--202.
Moral and Epistemic Virtues.Michael S. Brady & Duncan Pritchard - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (1-2):1-11.

View all 7 references / Add more references