Abstract

Connexive logic is philosophically superior to truth-functional logic. It is the logic that we ought to be using, in place of truth-functional logic, to guide conceptual analysis and to determine the validity or invalidity of arguments. Connexive logic correctly maps the inference relation as that relation would be understood by a metaphysical realist. Truth-functional logic maps the inference relation as that relation would be understood by a metaphysical nominalist. The philosophical superiority of connexive logic follows from the philosophical superiority of realism over nominalism. The essential difference between realism and nominalism is that realism accepts the reality of law-governed regularities, while nominalism treats all regularities as merely coincidental. For this reason nominalism finds itself unable to give a coherent account of classes, relations, meanings and properties. Realism, on the other hand, allows us to think correctly about the relations of individuals to classes and the relations of classes to each other