Synthese 198 (7):6767-6787 (2021)

Authors
Johanna Thoma
London School of Economics
Abstract
Judgementalism is an interpretation of normative decision theory according to which preferences are all-things-considered judgements of relative desirability, and the only attitudes that rationally constrain choice. The defence of judgementalism we find in Richard Bradley’s Decision Theory with a Human Face relies on a kind of internalism about the requirements of rationality, according to which they supervene on an agent’s mental states, and in particular those she can reason from. I argue that even if we grant such internalism, attitudes other than preferences in the judgementalist sense rationally constrain choice. This ultimately supports a different interpretation of preference.
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-019-02487-0
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References found in this work BETA

Slaves of the Passions.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
Decision Theory with a Human Face.Richard Bradley - 2017 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Folk Psychology and the Interpretation of Decision Theory.Johanna Thoma - 2021 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7.
On the Individuation of Choice Options.Roberto Fumagalli - 2020 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 50 (4):338-365.

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