Apostate rationalism and Maimon's Hume

Journal of the History of Philosophy 46 (4):pp. 591-618 (2008)

Abstract

The paper examines the way in which Salomon Maimon (1753-1800) combines Humean skepticism and Leibnizian rationalism to mount an innovative challenge to Kant. Maimon’s position can be described as an “apostate rationalism,” which holds that reason makes unavoidable demands on us that are nonetheless not satisfied in experience. An appreciation of Maimon’s arguments also sheds new and interesting light on the surprising role that this apostate rationalism plays as a component of Hume’s skeptical naturalism.

Download options

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 72,722

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
61 (#190,980)

6 months
3 (#198,250)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work

Introduction to Salomon Maimon’s “On the First Grounds of Natural Right”.Michael Nance & Jason Yonover - 2020 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 29 (1):146-156.
Maimon's Post-Kantian Skepticism.Emily Fitton - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Essex

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Perception, Reason & Knowledge.Douglas Gene Arner - 1972 - Glenview, Ill., Scott, Foresman.
Solomon Maimon: An Autobiography.Salomon Maimon - 1967 - New York: Schocken Books.
Salomon Maimon and the Rise of Spinozism in German Idealism.Yitzhak Y. Melamed - 2004 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 42 (1):67-96.
Salomon Maimon and the Metaphorical Nature of Language.Lucie Pargačová - 2009 - Estetika: The European Journal of Aesthetics 46 (2):167-177.
Salomon Maimon.Peter Thielke - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Ethics of Salomon Maimon (1753-1800).David Baumgardt - 1963 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 1 (2):199-210.