Law and Philosophy 38 (2):149-167 (2019)

Areti Theofilopoulou
University of Hong Kong
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, I defend and expand the Fortificationist Theory of Punishment. Second, I argue that this theory implies that non-consensual neurointerventions – interventions that act directly on one’s brain – are permissible. According to the FTP, punishment is justified as a way of ensuring that citizens who infringe their duty to demonstrate the reliability of their moral powers will thereafter be able to comply with it. I claim that the FTP ought to be expanded to include citizens’ interest in developing their moral powers. Thus, states must ensure that their citizens develop their moral reliability, not only because they must enforce their citizens’ compliance with certain duties, but also because states have the duty to maintain the conditions for stability and satisfy their citizens’ interest in developing their moral powers. According to this account of the FTP, if neurointerventions are the only or best way of ensuring that offenders can discharge their fortificational duties, states have strong reasons to provide these interventions.
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DOI 10.1007/s10982-018-09341-3
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References found in this work BETA

Liberalism Without Perfection.Jonathan Quong - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry Frankfurt - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 2003 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Respect and the Basis of Equality.Ian Carter - 2011 - Ethics 121 (3):538-571.

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