Myth & math, part II (preliminary draft)

Synthese 88 (2):179 - 199 (1991)
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Abstract

It is argued that there can only be a small-finite number of mathematical objects; that these objects range from the very concrete to the very abstract; and that mathematics is essentially not concerned with objects but with concepts. This viewpoint is described as mentalist and is upheld over Platonism, intuitionism, and formalism.

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10.1007/bf00567745

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Mathematics and fiction II: Analogy.Robert Thomas - 2002 - Logique Et Analyse 45:185-228.

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