Infinite arguments and semantics of dialectical proof procedures

Argument and Computation 13 (2):121-157 (2022)
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Abstract

We study the semantics of dialectical proof procedures. As dialectical proof procedures are in general sound but not complete wrt admissibility semantics, a natural question here is whether we could give a more precise semantical characterization of what they compute. Based on a new notion of infinite arguments representing loops, we introduce a stricter notion of admissibility, referred to as strict admissibility, and show that dialectical proof procedures are in general sound and complete wrt strict admissibility.

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