Abstract

Although the Euthyphro explicitly ends in , careful analysis of the dialogue reveals that it is an extra-judicial defense of Socrates against the charge of impiety. This private apologia consists primarily in redefining piety as doing philosophy, and in justifying that definition in two ways: positively by an appeal to the hierarchical structure of changing reality, and negatively by the ironic claim of Socrates not to know, and his correction of Euthyphro's impiety, at least theoretically. ;This defense, however, is not without its own problems. Specifically, Socrates' reverence for the divine things places him in an ambiguous relationship to the city. While this ambiguous relationship cannot be seen as a conflict between philosophy and religion per se, it does reveal a conflict between philosophical piety and political piety, or, more broadly, a conflict between philosophy and politics. As a consequence, philosophy must be practiced esoterically, if philosophy is to protect itself against the city's suspicions. ;Included is an appendix which compares the Euthyphro and Laws, Book X