Abstract

The aim of the paper is to test the possibility of adopting in the humanities Karl R. Popper’s model of science. Its raison d’être is the contemporary situation of the humanities. Difficult on account of their complex and elusive subject, it has recently become aggravated as a result of the poststructuralist rejection of the classical concept of science in favour of either cognitive relativism or approaches openly admitting to ideological bias. Popper’s model of science might help protect the standards of research in the humanities, as it entails inter alia falsifiability as the criterion of demarcation for science, the correspondence theory of truth, and, above all, the method of critical rationalism. An attempt to apply Popper’s ideas in the humanities is further legitimized by his recognition that, although the object of their investigation is World 3, their method is the same as that of the sciences: problems, tentative solutions and their critical examination. The most problematic issues in the project concern falsification, formulation of universal laws and predictions. Some of the difficulties might be overcome with the help of Popper’s cognitive theory of art. Popper argued, namely, that art’s primary function is cognitive , that its nature is semiotic, that its origin is mythic, and that the process of its creation consists in interaction between the mind of the artist and the object of World 3 the mind is engaged in creating. Key words POPPER, HUMANITIES, FALSIFICATION