Abstract
Penelope Maddy has recently addressed the set-theoretic multiverseset-theoretic multiverse, and expressed reservations on its status and merits Foundations of mathematics. Essays in honor of W. Hugh Woodin’s 60th birthday. Contemporary mathematics. American Mathematical Society, Providence, pp. 289–322, 2017). The purpose of the paper is to examine her concerns, by using the interpretative framework of set-theoretic naturalismset-theoretic naturalism. I first distinguish three main forms of ‘multiversism’multiversism, and then I proceed to analyse MaddyMaddy’s concerns. Among other things, I take into account salient aspects of multiverse-related mathematics, in particular, research programmes in set theory for which the use of the multiverse seems to be crucial, and show how one may provide responses to MaddyMaddy’s concerns based on a careful analysis of ‘multiverse practice’.