Rule-circularity and the justification of deduction

Philosophical Quarterly 55 (221):625–648 (2005)
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Abstract

I examine Paul Boghossian's recent attempt to argue for scepticism about logical rules. I argue that certain rule- and proof-theoretic considerations can avert such scepticism. Boghossian's 'Tonk Argument' seeks to justify the rule of tonk-introduction by using the rule itself. The argument is subjected here to more detailed proof-theoretic scrutiny than Boghossian undertook. Its sole axiom, the so-called Meaning Postulate for tonk, is shown to be false or devoid of content. It is also shown that the rules of Disquotation and of Semantic Ascent cannot be derived for sentences with tonk dominant. These considerations deprive Boghossian's scepticism of its support

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Citations of this work

Truth, Revenge, and Internalizability.Kevin Scharp - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S3):597-645.
On the Justification Problems: Towards a Peircean Diagnosis and Solution.Liuhua Zhang - 2017 - History and Philosophy of Logic 38 (3):222-238.

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References found in this work

The Runabout Inference-Ticket.A. N. Prior - 1960 - Analysis 21 (2):38-39.
Tonk, Plonk and Plink.Nuel Belnap - 1962 - Analysis 22 (6):130-134.
The runabout inference ticket.Arthur Prior - 1967 - In P. F. Strawson (ed.), Philosophical logic. London,: Oxford University Press. pp. 38-9.
How Are Objective Epistemic Reasons Possible?Paul Boghossian - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 106 (1-2):1-40.

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