§1. Exposition
Abstract
Peacocke argues for a ‘generalized rationalism’, holding that ‘all entitlement has a fundamentally a priori component.’ (2) But his rationalism ‘differs from those of Frege and Gödel, just as theirs differ from that of Leibniz.’ He requires both substantive theories of intentional content and of understanding, and systematic formal theories of referential semantics and truth. We need an externalist theory of content: ‘Only mental states with externally individuated contents can make judgements about the external, mind-independent world rational.’ (123) Purely evidential conceptions of meaning and content are inadequate. (34-49) They cannot account for the following: a thinker often has to work out what would be evidence for a content; contents cannot depend, for their identity, on all of the infinitely ramifying evidential connections among them; and thinkers conceive, however tacitly, of (at least some) observed properties as categorical. By contrast with an evidential theory, a truthconditional theory of content can account for all these problematic facts. Peacocke states, develops and defends three principles of rationalism which collectively ‘relate entitlement to truth, to the identity of states and their intentional contents, and to the a priori.’ (3-4) He does not thoroughly explain his central notion of entitlement, but this much is clear: any thinker is entitled to various transitions in, or into, thought. An example of a transition into thought would be that from one’s perceptual experience to an observational judgment. An example of a transition in thought would be a logical inference from certain premises to a conclusion. A transition is rational just in case the thinker is entitled to it. (Note that this aims to explain rationality in terms of entitlement, not the other way round.) It is clear from 28 that Peacocke needs an abstract ontology of entitlements (such as proofs, in the case of mathematics). Yet he does not endorse ‘Gödel’s obscure quasi-perceptual and quasi-causal epistemology of mathematics and the abstract sciences.’ (54..