Abstract

This thesis examines how and why Leibniz felt that physics must be grounded in metaphysics. I argue that one of the strongest motivation Leibniz had for attempting to ground physics in metaphysics was his concern over the problem of induction. Even in his early writings, Leibniz was well aware of the problem of induction and how this problem threatened the very possibility of physics. Both his early and later theories of truth are geared towards solving this deep problem in the philosophy of science. In his early theory of truth, all truths are ultimately grounded in an identity. Hence, all truths are ultimately based in logic. Consequently, the problem of induction is seemingly solved since everything that happens, happens with the force of logical necessity. Unfortunately, this theory is incompatible with Leibniz's theory of possible worlds and hence, jeopardizes the liberty of God. In Leibniz's later theory of truth, Leibniz tries to overcome this weakness by acknowledging truths that are grounded in the free but moral necessity of God's actions. Since God's benevolence is responsible for the actualization of this world, then this world must possess rational laws. Furthermore, since God's rationality ensures that everything obeys the principle of sufficient reason, then we can use this principle to determine the fundamental laws of the universe. Leibniz himself attempts to derive these laws using this principle. Kant attempted to continue this work of securing the possibility of science, and the problems he encountered helped to shape his critical philosophy. So I conclude by a comparative analysis of Leibniz and Kant on the foundations of physics