Learning to live with voluntarism

Synthese 178 (1):49-66 (2011)
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Abstract

This paper examines and finds wanting the arguments against van Fraassen’s voluntarism, the view that the only constraint of rationality is consistency. Foundationalists claim that if we have no grounds or rationale for a belief or rule, rationality demands that we suspend it. But that begs the question by assuming that there have to be grounds or a rationale. Instead of asking, why should we hold a basic belief or rule, the question has to be: why should not we be committed as we are? Within a system we can sometimes find internal reasons. But, short of assuming foundationalism from the outset, when it comes to our evolving system as a whole there are no grounds for abandoning the commitments that we experience so strongly. Along the way the paper develops a systematic way of talking about terms that cause confusion because of variation in usage: foundationalism, relativism, basic beliefs and rules, voluntarism, etc.

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Citations of this work

Immoderately rational.Sophie Horowitz - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):41-56.
Constraints on Rational Theory Choice.Seamus Bradley - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (3):639-661.
Making worlds with symbols.Paul Teller - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 21):5015-5036.

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References found in this work

The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Synthese 11 (1):86-89.
Morality, normativity, and society.David Copp - 1995 - New York: Oxford University Press.
From Vicious Circle to Infinite Regress, and Back Again.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1992 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:6-29.

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