Third-Order Epistemic Exclusion in Professional Philosophy

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Symposion. Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Zahra Thani & Derek Anderson ABSTRACT: Third-order exclusion is a form of epistemic oppression in which the epistemic lifeway of a dominant group disrupts the epistemic agency of members of marginalized groups. In this paper we apply situated perspectives in order to argue that philosophy as a discipline imposes third-order exclusions on members of marginalized …

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Conceptualizing Epistemic Oppression.Kristie Dotson - 2014 - Social Epistemology 28 (2):115-138.
A Cautionary Tale: On Limiting Epistemic Oppression.Kristie Dotson - 2012 - Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies 33 (1):24-47.
How is this Paper Philosophy?Kristie Dotson - 2012 - Comparative Philosophy 3 (1):3-29.
Free will.Sam Harris - 2012 - New York: Free Press.

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