Recanati on Communication of First‐person Thoughts

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (3):210-218 (2012)
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Abstract

In this paper, I will provide a counterexample to Recanati's account of first-person communication (1995, 2010, 2012). In particular, I will show that Recanati's constraints are not sufficient for the success of first-person communication. My argument against Recanati's account is parallel to Recanati's argument against neo-Russellian accounts, and shows that the same problem resurfaces even in the presence of linguistically encoded mode of presentation in a neo-Fregean framework of mental files.

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10.1002/tht3.37

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Sajed Tayebi
Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences

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References found in this work

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
The Varieties of Reference.Louise M. Antony - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):275.
Direct Reference: From Language to Thought.François Récanati - 1993 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
The Frege reader.Gottlob Frege & Michael Beaney (eds.) - 1997 - Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell.
The Interpretation of Fregeʼs Philosophy.Michael Dummett - 1980 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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