Powerful qualities, the conceivability argument and the nature of the physical

Philosophical Studies 174 (8):1895-1910 (2017)
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Abstract

David Chalmers’ ‘conceivability’ argument against physicalism is perhaps the most widely discussed and controversial argument in contemporary philosophy of mind. Recently, several thinkers have suggested a novel response to this argument, which employs the ‘powerful qualities’ ontology of properties. In this paper, I argue that this response fails because it presupposes an implausible account of the physical/phenomenal distinction. In the course of establishing this, I discuss the so-called ‘ultimate’ argument for the claim that dispositional properties form the subject matter of physics. I argue that the ultimate argument can be interpreted in a strong or a weak way, and that the strong interpretation is implausible. I argue that this undermines the powerful qualities based response to the conceivability argument. I also argue for a general conclusion: that we should not define ‘the physical’ exclusively in terms of a distinction drawn from ontology.

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Citations of this work

Zombies.Robert Kirk - 2003 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The relation between subjects and their conscious experiences.Henry Taylor - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3493-3507.

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References found in this work

Facing up to the problem of consciousness.David Chalmers - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):200-19.
The character of consciousness.David John Chalmers - 2010 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Does conceivability entail possibility.David J. Chalmers - 2002 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 145--200.
A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1997 - New York: Cambridge University Press.

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