Cognitive Instrumentalism about Mental Representations

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (3):518-550 (2021)
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Abstract

Representationalists and anti-representationalists disagree about whether a naturalisation of mental content is possible and, hence, whether positing mental representations in cognitive science is justified. Here, I develop a novel way to think about mental representations based on a philosophical description of (cognitive) science inspired by cognitive instrumentalism. On this view, our acceptance of theories positing mental representations and our beliefs in (something like) mental representations do not depend on the naturalisation of content. Thus, I conclude that if we endorse cognitive instrumentalism about mental representations, then we can finally leave the dispute between representationalism and anti-representationalism behind.

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Citations of this work

Concepts as a working hypothesis.Samuel D. Taylor - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology (4):569-594.
Tasks in cognitive science: mechanistic and nonmechanistic perspectives.Samuel D. Taylor - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-27.

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References found in this work

The representational character of experience.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.
Knowledge and the Flow of Information.Fred I. Dretske - 1981 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 175 (1):69-70.

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