Inductive reasoning and chance discovery

Minds and Machines 14 (4):441-451 (2004)
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Abstract

This paper argues that chance (risk or opportunity) discovery is challenging, from a reasoning point of view, because it represents a dilemma for inductive reasoning. Chance discovery shares many features with the grue paradox. Consequently, Bayesian approaches represent a potential solution. The Bayesian solution evaluates alternative models generated using a temporal logic planner to manage the chance. Surprise indices are used in monitoring the conformity of the real world and the assessed probabilities. Game theoretic approaches are proposed to deal with multi-agent interaction in chance management.

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References found in this work

Probability and Evidence.Paul Horwich - 1982 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 47 (4):687-688.
The New Riddle of Induction.Nelson Goodman - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
Prior Probabilities.Edwin T. Jaynes - 1968 - Ieee Transactions on Systems and Cybernetics (3):227-241.

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