Abstract

Whether Edmund Husserl is a realist or idealist or metaphysically neutral is still often debated among his commentators. Instead of making an over-generalized claim about Husserl’s thought, this study only focuses on intentionality theory to know toward which Husserl is metaphysically committed in that theory. This study, therefore, aims to metaphysically reconstruct Husserl’s theory of intentionality and then prove that the theory is realist, not idealist nor metaphysically neutral. By using the textual analysis method, this study finds four important points in Husserl’s works regarding intentionality theory. Firstly, in the Husserlian framework of intentionality, consciousness always intends its objects through the mediation of a certain meaning. Secondly, objects toward which consciousness is directed are transcendent and independent from consciousness. Thirdly, a single object can be intended by consciousness through different meanings according to the perspective that determines the intention. Therefore, fourthly, Husserl’s theory of intentionality can be categorized as one version of perspectival realism.