Compared to the extensive amount of literature on various themes of W.V.O. Quine’s philosophy, his
immanent concept of truth remains a relatively unexplored topic. This relative lack of research
contributes to a persistent confusion on the deflationary and inflationary details of Quine’s truth.
According to a popular reading, Quine’s disquotational definition of the truth predicate exhausts the
content of truth, thus amounting to a deflationary view. Others promote opposing interpretations. I
argue that by relying on Tarski’s semantic conception of truth, Quine’s disquotational account
inherits a commitment to classical correspondence intuitions. Based on this, Quine posits a firm
constitution for truth as an intermediary between language and the world. From this constitution
claim follows that the disquotational account proves incompatible with both the general
deflationary thesis and, more specifically, the minimalist account, which deny any constitution for
truth past what is given by the preferred deflationary schema. This reading is significant for refuting the
widespread misrepresentations of Quine as a prominent deflationist.