Negation, denial and language change in philosophical logic

Abstract

This paper uses the strengthened liar paradox as a springboard to illuminate two more general topics: i) the negation operator and the speech act of denial among speakers of English and ii) some ways the potential for acceptable language change is constrained by linguistic meaning. The general and special problems interact in reciprocally illuminating ways. The ultimate objective of the paper is, however, less to solve certain problems than to create others, by illustrating how the issues that form the topic of this paper are more intricate than previously realised, and that they are related in delicate and somewhat surprising ways.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,551

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Similar books and articles

What is Negation?Dov M. Gabbay & Heinrich Wansing (eds.) - 1999 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.
This is not an instance of (E).Teresa Marques - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):1035–1063.
Weak Negation in Inquisitive Semantics.Vít Punčochář - 2015 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 24 (3):323-355.
Negation, Denial, and Rejection.David Ripley - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (9):622-629.
Negation in the language of theology – some issues.Adam Olszewski - 2018 - Philosophical Problems in Science 65:87-107.
Articulation and Liars.Sergi Oms - 2017 - Disputatio 9 (46):383-399.
The Liar Paradox.James Werner Scow - 1991 - Dissertation, Columbia University
An illocutionary logical explanation of the liar paradox.John T. Kearns - 2007 - History and Philosophy of Logic 28 (1):31-66.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
129 (#170,532)

6 months
4 (#1,255,690)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jamie Tappenden
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

Citations of this work

Logical pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (4):475 – 493.
The Problem of Lexical Innovation.Josh Armstrong - 2016 - Linguistics and Philosophy 39 (2):87-118.
Cheap contextualism.Peter Ludlow - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):104-129.
Absolute Contradiction, Dialetheism, and Revenge.Francesco Berto - 2014 - Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (2):193-207.
Carnap’s Tolerance, Meaning, and Logical Pluralism.Greg Restall - 2002 - Journal of Philosophy 99 (8):426-443.

View all 32 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references