Mixed inferences: A problem for pluralism about truth predicates

Analysis 57 (3):209–210 (1997)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In reply to Geach's objection against expressivism, some have claimed that there is a plurality of truth predicates. I raise a difficulty for this claim: valid inferences can involve sentences assessable by any truth predicate, corresponding to 'lightweight' truth as well as to 'heavyweight' truth. To account for this, some unique truth predicate must apply to all sentences that can appear in inferences. Mixed inferences remind us of a central platitude about truth: truth is what is preserved in valid inferences. The question is why we should postulate truth predicates that do not satisfy this platitude.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,227

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
330 (#62,096)

6 months
25 (#115,544)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Christine Tappolet
Université de Montréal

Citations of this work

Hindsight bias is not a bias.Brian Hedden - 2019 - Analysis 79 (1):43-52.
Truth and multiple realizability.Michael P. Lynch - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):384 – 408.
Domains, plural truth, and mixed atomic propositions.Jeremy Wyatt - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (S1):225-236.
Putting Pluralism in its Place.Jamin Asay - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):175–191.
Alethic Pluralism for Pragmatists.Tom Kaspers - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-19.

View all 57 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references