Biased belief in the Bayesian brain: A deeper look at the evidence

Consciousness and Cognition 68 (C):107-114 (2019)
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Abstract

A recent critique of hierarchical Bayesian models of delusion argues that, contrary to a key assumption of these models, belief formation in the healthy (i.e., neurotypical) mind is manifestly non-Bayesian. Here we provide a deeper examination of the empirical evidence underlying this critique. We argue that this evidence does not convincingly refute the assumption that belief formation in the neurotypical mind approximates Bayesian inference. Our argument rests on two key points. First, evidence that purports to reveal the most damning violation of Bayesian updating in human belief formation is counterweighted by substantial evidence that indicates such violations are the rare exception—not a common occurrence. Second, the remaining evidence does not demonstrate convincing violations of Bayesian inference in human belief updating; primarily because this evidence derives from study designs that produce results that are not obviously inconsistent with Bayesian principles.

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Stephen Gadsby
University of Antwerp

Citations of this work

Echoes of covid misinformation.Neil Levy - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 36 (5):931-948.
Bad beliefs: automaticity, arationality, and intervention.Stephen Gadsby - 2023 - Philosophical Psychology 36 (4):778-791.
Belief’s minimal rationality.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3263-3282.
Epistemic Irrationality in the Bayesian Brain.Daniel Williams - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (4):913-938.

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