Sophia 43 (1):61-72 (2004)
AbstractThe paper is concerned with John Searle’s famous Chinese room argument. Despite being objected to by some, Searle’s Chinese room argument appears very appealing. This is because Searle’s argument is based on an intuition about the mind that ‘we’ all seem to share. Ironically, however, Chinese philosophers don’t seem to share this same intuition. The paper begins by first analysing Searle’s Chinee room argument. It then introduces what can be seen as the (implicit) Chinese view of the mind. Lastly, it demonstrates a conceptual difference between Chinese and Western philosophy with respect to the notion of mind. Thus, it is shown that one must carefully attend to the presuppositions underlying Chinese philosophising in interpreting Chinese philosophers
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Citations of this work
How Can a Buddha Come to Act?: The Possibility of a Buddhist Account of Ethical Agency.Bronwyn Finnigan - 2011 - Philosophy East and West 61 (1):134-160.
Idealist Origins: 1920s and Before.Martin Davies & Stein Helgeby - 2014 - In Graham Oppy & Nick Trakakis (eds.), History of Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer. pp. 15-54.
References found in this work
Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions.Jonathan M. Weinberg, Shaun Nichols & Stephen Stich - 2001 - Philosophical Topics, 29 (1-2):429-460.
Minds, Brains, and Programs.John Searle - 1980 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.
A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought: A Philosophical Interpretation.Chad Hansen - 1992 - Oxford University Press.
Thinking Through Confucius.David L. Hall & Roger T. Ames - 1987 - Philosophy East and West 41 (2):241-254.