Abstract

For Immanuel Kant moral motivation is the center of ethical concern. This is often understood to entail two claims: acting from duty alone is both necessary and sufficient for moral action, and moral action is in all cases rationally preferable to nonmoral action. Both claims have drawn intense criticism, especially from those who argue for the moral and rational value of emotionally expressive actions such as acts of love, compassion, and sympathy. These critics present Kant with a dilemma. If acts of love are moral actions, then the motive of love is a moral motive, and acting from duty alone is neither necessary nor sufficient for moral action. If acts of love are not moral actions, then moral actions are not rationally preferable to nonmoral actions, since it is rational, at least in some cases, to prefer acts of love. ;Both the critics of Kant and Kantians agree that moral motives are necessary for moral actions. However, they disagree about which motives are moral. Kantians have attempted to accommodate emotional motives while maintaining that acting from duty, though not duty alone, is both necessary and sufficient for moral action, which they hold to be rationally preferable to nonmoral actions. I argue that acting from duty, when properly understood, cannot be sufficient for moral action, and also that not enough has been done to secure the claim that the motive of duty is necessary for moral action. ;What is missing from both sides of the debate is a direct discussion of the nature of moral motivation. I argue that when an act is morally motivated, the agent acts with the intention of either realizing or not undermining the moral end, where the agent values the moral end more highly than any nonmoral end. Understanding moral motivation this way makes it possible to explain why moral motives are necessary for moral action. It also makes better sense of multiple motivations and provides a guide for understanding the nature of emotional motives. I maintain that a Kantian can and should accept that love, when properly formed, is a moral motive.