Cafe Babel:39-48 (2013)

Authors
Attila Tanyi
University of Tromsø
Abstract
The paper begins with a detailed discussion of the Overdemandingness Objection to consequentialism. It argues that the best interpretation of the Objection is the one that focuses on reasons: consequentialism is overdemanding because it demands us, with decisive force, to do things that, intuitively, we do not have decisive reason to do. After this, the paper goes on to offer three – so far in the literature unpursued – responses to the Objection. The first puts forward a constitutive role of instutions in determining and, in face of the Objection, lowering the demands of consequentialism; the second argues that consequentialism does not give us decisive reasons to act; the third doubts that the intuition that consequentialist requirements lack decisive force, does in fact exists.
Keywords consequentialism  demandingness  moral reasons  institutions  moral intuitions
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References found in this work BETA

Famine, Affluence, and Morality.Peter Singer - 1972 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (3):229-243.
The Problem of Global Justice.Thomas Nagel - 2005 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 33 (2):113-147.
Institutions and the Demands of Justice.Liam B. Murphy - 1998 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 27 (4):251-291.
Famine, Affluence, and Morality.Peter Singer - 1985 - In Lawrence A. Alexander (ed.), International Ethics: A Philosophy and Public Affairs Reader. Princeton University Press. pp. 247-262.
The Impotence of the Demandingness Objection.David Sobel - 2007 - Philosophers' Imprint 7:1-17.

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