Abstract

Contemporary liberalism that each individual has the basic freedoms and rights, can and should become an autonomous person. Because people are autonomous, they have the right to determine their own direction in life and values. Government should not interfere with the pursuit of individual autonomy, should not be a whole set of values ​​imposed on all individuals. Government should do is to protect individual freedoms and rights, and provide basic conditions for the individual's life and values. This paper attempts to respond to contemporary Confucian position that liberalism and value of self-perception. This paper would like to work in two parts: first, through the interpretation of Confucian, explore the core of Confucian concern - the ritual order dominated human relations - whether self-understanding of contemporary liberalism compatible. In particular, suppose we accept this self-understanding, whether Confucian human relations may be regarded as a basic benefit products? Second, try to clarify the pre-Confucian human relations of self-understanding, and explore the Confucian self-understanding is available to fix or even replace the self-understanding of contemporary liberalism. Contemporary liberalism maintains that every individual has basic liberties and rights, and that every individual could and should become an autonomous being. Every autonomous person has the right to determine their own life vision and values. Government should not interfere with an autonomous person's life pursuit, and should not enforce any comprehensive doctrine. The role of government is only to protect individual's liberties and rights, and to provide basic goods that are necessary for an individual's pursuit of values ​​and life fulfilment. This paper attempts to respond to such an idea of ​​self and values ​​of liberalism from the perspective of Confucianism. This paper has two objectives. First, through an interpretation of Pre-Qin Confucianism, this paper asks if the central concern of Confucianism, that is, human relationships mediated by rites, is compatible with liberalism's conception of person. Especially, granted that we accept such a conception of person, is it possible that Confucian human relationships be viewed as a kind of primary goods? Second, this paper tries to articulates the conception of person presupposed by Confucian human relationships and inquires if such a Confucian conception of person can modify or replace the liberal conception of person.